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Accumulated Injuries of Environmental Injustice:
Living and Working with Petrochemical Pollution
in Nanjing, China
Alice Mah and Xinhong Wang
Department of Sociology, University of Warwick
This article examines perceptions of living and working with toxic pollution in two periurban petrochemical
areas in Nanjing, China, a heavily polluted megacity on the Yangtze River. Despite the concentrated
geography of the petrochemical industry in Nanjing, protests over pollution have been small scale and
highly localized, paralleling dynamics in many “cancer villages” of rural China. This contrasts with high-
profile anti-PX (paraxylene) protests that have happened in Xiamen, Dalian, and other cities in China over
the past decade. This article draws on twenty-five semistructured interviews and participant observation with
workers and residents in both petrochemical areas. We extend the idea of the “hidden injuries of class”
(Sennett and Cobb 1972) to analyze the cumulative effects of social and environmental inequalities in
China, contributing to interdisciplinary debates about environmental justice and health, environmental
pollution in China, and the lived experiences of toxic geographies. We argue that people living and working
with petrochemical pollution in Nanjing, China, experienced accumulated injuries of environmental
injustice: multilayered and intersecting effects on health and well-being, which reflect social inequalities
between different populations. Accumulated injuries of environmental injustice emerged in interrelated ways:
epistemic injustices about toxic exposures; unequal and inadequate compensations for environment harm;
and collective frustrations over political powerlessness. The research has wider implications for analyzing the
complex social effects of living and working with environmental injustice in different places around the
world. Key Words: China, environmental health, environmental justice, petrochemical industry, toxic pollution.
本文检视中国南京这个座落于长江沿岸饱受严重污染的大都会中的两个市区外围石化工业地区, 对于和
有毒污染物共同生活与工作的认知。尽管石化工业在南京的集中地理, 对于污染的抗议却往往规模小且
高度在地化, 并与中国农村诸多“癌症村”的动态相似。这与中国过去十年来在厦门、大连以及其他城市中
高调反对PX（对二甲苯）的抗议活动形成对比。本文运用在两个石化工业地区中对工人与居民的二十五
个半结构访谈和参与式观察。我们延伸“阶级隐而不显的伤害”之概念（Sennett and Cobb 1972）, 分析中
国社会与环境不均的积累效应, 并对环境正义与健康、中国的环境污染, 以及有毒地理的生活经验之跨领
域辩论做出贡献。我们主张, 在中国南京受到石化污染的地区生活与工作的人们, 经历了环境不正义的累
积伤害：对健康与福祉的多层级与相互交织之效应, 并反映不同人口之间的社会不均。环境不正义的累
积伤害, 以相互关联的方式浮现：有关毒物暴露的认识论上的不均；对环境伤害不均且不足的赔偿；以
及对政治无权的集体挫败。本研究对于分析在世界各地与环境不正义共同生存与工作的复杂社会效应有
着更为广泛的意涵。关键词：中国, 环境健康, 环境正义, 石化产业, 有毒污染。
Este artıculo examina las percepciones sobre vivir y trabajar con polucion toxica en dos areas petroquımicas
periurbanas de Nanjing, China, una megaciudad altamente contaminada situada sobre el Rıo Yangtze. A
pesar de la geografıa concentrada de la industria petroquımica de Nanjing, las protestas contra la polucion
han sido limitadas y altamente localizadas, mostrando la dinamica del paralelismo de muchas “aldeas del
cancer” de la China rural. Esto contrasta con las protestas de alto perfil anti-PX (paraxileno) que han
ocurrido en Xiamen, Dalian y otras ciudades chinas durante la pasada decada. El artıculo se basa en
veinticinco entrevistas semiestructuradas y observacion participativa con trabajadores y residentes en las dos
areas petroquımicas aludidas. Ampliamos la idea de las “heridas ocultas de clase” (Sennett y Cobb 1972)
para analizar los efectos acumulativos de las desigualdades sociales y ambientales de China, contribuyendo a
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los debates interdisciplinarios sobre justicia ambiental y salud, la contaminacion ambiental en China y las
experiencias vividas de las geografıas toxicas. Sostenemos que la gente que vive y trabaja expuesta a la
polucion petroquımica en Nanjing, China, sufre lesiones acumuladas de injusticia ambiental: efectos
multicapa e intersectoriales sobre la salud y el bienestar, que reflejan las desigualdades sociales entre
diferentes poblaciones. Las heridas acumuladas de injusticia ambiental emergieron de maneras
interrelacionadas: injusticias epistemicas alrededor de exposiciones toxicas, compensaciones desiguales e
inadecuadas por da~no ambiental, y frustraciones colectivas sobre impotencia polıtica. La investigacion tiene
implicaciones mas amplias para el analisis de los complejos efectos sociales de vivir y trabajar con injusticia
ambiental en diferentes lugares alrededor del mundo. Palabras clave: China, industria petroquımica, justicia
ambiental, polucion toxica, salud ambiental.
The evening sun sets over the sports field of astate-owned petrochemical factory in Nanjing,where people of various ages are jogging,
stretching, and walking. The petrochemical factory
is located next to a middle school, apartment build-
ings, and shops, south of the Yangtze River.
Inscribed above the stadium entrance are the words:
“Healthy life, happy work.” Similar sayings line the
walls of petrochemical factories across Nanjing:
“Create real safety, care for employee life”; “Bearing
in mind social responsibility, abide by the concept of
integrity.” Echoing the corporate social responsibility
catchphrases of multinational petrochemical corpora-
tions, these slogans also link to propaganda posters
around the city promoting “socialist core values” and
Xi Jinping’s vision of the “Chinese Dream.” Yet
beneath the veneer of “harmonious society,” there is
a wide gap between the slogans and everyday life in
petrochemical areas in Nanjing.
Much scholarly attention has focused on mass
anti-paraxylene (PX) protests against petrochemical
companies in China (see Lee and Ho 2014; Gu
2016; Steinhardt and Wu 2016). The first large-scale
protest in China against a PX petrochemical project
occurred in Xiamen in 2007 and led to the reloca-
tion of the project to another city where there was
less public resistance.1 Since then, anti-PX protests
have occurred in a number of cities across China,
including Dalian, Kunming, Maoming, and
Chengdu, among others. Our research shifts atten-
tion from large-scale environmental protests to
everyday experiences of petrochemical pollution in
urban China, focusing on the case of Nanjing.
Despite the concentration of the chemical industry
in Nanjing, protests over pollution have been rela-
tively small scale, involving local residents in the
immediate vicinity of industry seeking compensation
for damages. What explains the lack of large-scale
opposition to the petrochemical industry in Nanjing?
This article examines narratives about pollution,
health, and industry among workers and residents in
two periurban petrochemical areas in Nanjing. The
research is based on twenty-five semistructured inter-
views and participant observation with workers and res-
idents in both petrochemical areas. It was conducted as
part of a large European Research Council–funded pro-
ject “Toxic Expertise” on the global petrochemical
industry in relation to debates about expertise and
environmental justice, with international case studies in
the United States, Europe, and China. We argue that
people living and working with petrochemical pollution
in Nanjing, China, have experienced accumulated inju-
ries of environmental injustice: multilayered and intersect-
ing effects on health and well-being, which reflect
social inequalities between different populations. These
accumulated injuries were embodied both individually
and collectively, and they revealed combined traumas
of socioeconomic decline, environmental contamin-
ation, illnesses, and political resignation. In particular,
people experienced anxieties about health risks and
deeply ambivalent attitudes about their capacity to
change their local environment.
Our analysis extends the idea of the “hidden inju-
ries of class” (Sennett and Cobb 1972) to analyze
the cumulative effects of social and environmental
inequality in China. In the postwar decades of a ris-
ing middle class in the United States, the hidden
injuries of class evoked a crisis of self-respect and
dignity among blue-collar workers, despite increasing
material power: “the feeling of not getting anywhere
despite one’s efforts, the feeling of vulnerability in
contrasting oneself to others at a higher social level,
the buried sense of inadequacy that one resents one-
self for feeling” (Sennett and Cobb 1972, 59). With
the unprecedented growth of China’s middle class
alongside deepening social inequality, internal con-
flicts have also emerged for many people who are
disappointed with “the insufficient improvement in
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lives amid rapid economic growth” (Tsinghua soci-
ologist Guo Yuhua, as cited in Osnos 2014, 272).
The “Chinese dream” has been promoted by the
Chinese Communist Party as a collective national
pathway toward prosperity and success, challenging
yet mirroring the myth of the American dream
(Bakken 2018).
The tremendous gaps between societal expecta-
tions and lived experiences in China are particularly
evident for people in heavily polluted places, which
typically have high levels of socioeconomic depriv-
ation and vulnerable populations (Shapiro 2012; Liu,
Liu, and Zhang 2014; Yang 2016). Environmental
justice research, including much scholarship within
human geography, has shown that low-income, eth-
nic minority, and marginalized people face the heav-
iest burdens of toxic pollution (Pellow 2007;
Schlosberg 2007; Bullard and Wright 2009; Walker
2012). Although this environmental justice research
has thus far been heavily centered on U.S. case stud-
ies (Reed and George 2011), China is no exception.
Residential areas in close proximity to petrochemical
facilities represent just one of many landscapes of
environmental injustice in China. Amidst rising
public discontent over pollution, in 2013 the
Chinese government admitted the existence of hun-
dreds of “cancer villages” in rural China (Gao 2013;
Lora-Wainwright 2017).
Environmental justice was the first environmental
discourse that was advanced by people of color in
the United States, and it brought together tactics
and energies from the civil rights, antitoxic, and
community and occupational health movements
(Bullard and Wright 2009; Taylor 2014).
Environmental justice demands a focus not only on
distribution but also on recognition and participa-
tion, as interlinking areas of concern (Schlosberg
2007). Since the 1990s, the environmental justice
movement has expanded beyond its original focus on
environmental racism to include other geographies
and socioeconomic factors (Agyeman et al. 2016;
Pellow 2007). It has also traveled to places beyond
the United States, with different reformulations and
adaptations. Despite its resonance with environmen-
tal problems in China, the concept of environmental
justice has not been taken up as a mobilizing dis-
course within Chinese civil society, although it has
been increasingly discussed within academic research
in China (see Quan 2002; Ke 2005; Liu, Liu, and
Zhang 2014; Mah and Wang 2017).
Although injustice is evoked within debates about
environmental justice, we argue that the concept of
injustice is more palpable and salient than justice
(see Fricker 2007; Barnett 2017), particularly in the
absence of environmental justice movements or local
environmental justice framings. In this article, we
consider everyday forms of environmental injustice,
through analyzing accumulated injuries of living and
working in polluted petrochemical areas with severe
yet normalized toxic exposures. Accumulated injuries
relate to the “slow violence” (Nixon 2011; Davies
2018) of environmental devastation that occurs in
the everyday lives of poor and marginalized com-
munities, beyond the media spectacle surrounding
large disasters and protests. These manifest as
unequal, multilayered, social effects of living and
working in polluted environments in China, within
a periurban industrial context. As Holdaway (2013)
argued, some of the greatest health risks from pollu-
tion concentrate in periurban areas in China, “where
agricultural and industrial activities intermingle, and
infrastructure, institutional and governance capacity
are weak” (270).
In this article, we first situate our research within
the context of petrochemical pollution and environ-
mental protests in China, before elaborating on our
case study methodology. Then, we present our
research findings, arguing that accumulated injuries
of environmental injustice for people who live and
work with petrochemical pollution in Nanjing
emerged in interrelated ways: epistemic injustices
about toxic exposures, unequal and inadequate com-
pensations for environment harm, and collective
frustrations over political powerlessness. We con-
clude by discussing the wider significance of the
research for examining the cumulative social effects
of working and living in toxic environments.
Petrochemical Pollution and
Environmental Protests in China
The health effects of exposure to toxic petro-
chemicals include cancer, respiratory illnesses, and
neurological damage (World Health Organization
2014). The negative social, health, and environmen-
tal effects of the petrochemical industry on
“fenceline” communities around the world have
been widely researched, from the petrochemical cor-
ridors of “Cancer Alley” in Louisiana in the United
States, to “Cancer Valley” in Sarnia, Ontario, to
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urban slums in Argentina (Allen 2003; Auyero and
Swistun 2009; Bullard and Wright 2009; Wiebe
2016; Davies 2018). In particular, researchers and
activists have focused on the environmental justice
and health struggles of black, indigenous, and minor-
ity ethnic populations who inhabit these polluted
communities. Despite some environmental justice
success stories, resulting in relocation or compensa-
tion, many petrochemical fenceline communities
around the world continue to experience high levels
of toxic exposure. Where there have been environ-
mental justice wins, there have also been losses, as
toxic hazards move to communities with weaker
political voices.
The petrochemical industry has played a crucial
role in China’s rapid economic growth, but it has
also caused repeated environmental conflicts. In the
twenty-first century, China emerged as a global leader
in the petrochemical industry, driven by its national
quest for self-sufficiency. The petrochemical industry
is considered one of the state’s “pillar industries” and
is dominated by three giant state-owned companies:
Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), and China National Offshore
Oil Corporation.2 Despite the Chinese government’s
repressive policies against mass demonstration, people
throughout China have protested against large-scale
petrochemical (PX) projects, in the form of “taking a
stroll,” from Xiamen (2007) and Maoming (2014) in
the south, to Dalian (2011) and Longkou (2016) in
the north. Much scholarship in China has focused on
the dynamics of environmental activism, noting the
relative power of urban middle classes in campaigning
for change but the lack of power of poor and
rural populations (J. Chen 2010; Lee and Ho 2014;
Gu 2016; Steinhardt and Wu 2016; Lora-
Wainwright 2017).
The petrochemical industry is just one of many
polluters in China, and it is not the worst offender,
as compared with heavy metals mining, for example.
The anti-PX protests, however, have political as well
as symbolic significance. After the first mass anti-PX
protest in Xiamen in 2007, PX effectively became a
byword for toxic industry in China. There have
been some notable cases of petrochemical accidents
leading to deaths, injuries, and evacuations, includ-
ing petrochemical plant explosions in Jilin in 2005
and chemical blasts in Tianjin in 2014. Media
reports have also drawn attention to petrochemical
cancer villages, such as the communities living
nearby Sinopec Zhenhai Refining and Chemical
Company in Ningbo of Zhejiang Province and
Jinling Village near Sinopec Qilu Petrochemical
Company in Zibo of Shandong Province (Chen
2012; Chai and Chen 2016).
Rather than focusing on protests, disasters, or can-
cer villages, our research examines the everyday
experiences of people who live and work with petro-
chemical pollution in China. This approach reso-
nates with ethnographic studies that have examined
the ambivalence of workers and residents living in
polluted petrochemical areas around the world, who
are concerned about impacts on environment and
health but rely on industry for jobs (Lopez-Navarro,
Tortosa-Edo, and Llorens-Monzonıs 2015; Neumann
2016; Jovanovic 2018). Our research reveals dynam-
ics that challenge universalizing frameworks about
industry, pollution, and communities. In China, with
a lack of publicly available information on corporate
polluting practices, local demographic information,
or epidemiological studies, it is difficult to assess the
levels of pollution or risk in a given area.
Furthermore, concerns about petrochemical hazards
are often eclipsed within the context of multiple
sources of pollution, including wider concerns about
urban air quality, particularly in socioeconomically
marginalized communities.
Petrochemical companies operate across multiple
territorial and networked scales, in a complex global
political ecology of material, socioeconomic, and
environmental dynamics (see Swyngedouw and
Heynen 2003). The levels of risk within petrochem-
ical fenceline communities vary across and within dif-
ferent regional and national contexts, with different
types and sizes of petrochemical facilities, regulatory
frameworks, monitoring and polluting practices, cor-
porate players, and proximity to rural or urban popu-
lations. In China, the staggering scale of
environmental contamination, the powerful legacy of
state-owned enterprises, and the constraints on civil
society together create a context that is both extreme
and typical, where one of the most intense accumu-
lated injuries is to people’s sense of agency, evident
in the common refrain, “But what can we do?”
Case Study Methodology: Periurban
Petrochemical Areas in Nanjing
The majority of the Chinese petrochemical indus-
try is located in eastern and northwestern China, as
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Figure 1. Map of Nanjing petrochemical industrial areas. Source: Nanjing hundred year time space construction and service (Jiang
2017). Prepared by Yiyun Chen. (Color figure available online.)
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well as in coastal areas (Zhang, Dong, and Tian
2009; Wu et al. 2015). Our research focused on the
case study of periurban Nanjing, a heavily polluted
megacity along the lower reach of the Yangtze
River, which is encircled by four heavy chemical
industry areas and surrounded by hills in three direc-
tions and water in one direction. The city govern-
ment of Nanjing has recognized the dangerous
geographical situation of the city, which traps pol-
luted air and lacks an easy escape route in the event
of an uncontrollable pollution incident. Nanjing has
a strong historical industrial legacy, dating from its
first years at a national hub for the chemical indus-
try in the 1950s, and it remains one of the top
national petrochemical bases within China.3 The oil
and petrochemical industry in China underwent sig-
nificant restructuring in the late 1990s, based on the
state’s principle of “grab the big, release the small”
(Nolan 2001; Lin 2008; Tobin 2008), which aimed
to centralize power in large state-owned enterprises,
while closing others, to compete in the global econ-
omy. Many chemical factories in Nanjing were
closed or relocated to a large chemical industry park
established in 2001 in the northeast of the city.
Although small and medium-sized companies have
been closed or relocated, the locked-in political
economy of the petrochemical industry has made it
difficult for the city government of Nanjing to
relocate large-scale state-owned petrochemical enter-
prises (Shi 2015; Wu et al. 2015).4 Furthermore,
relocating heavy industry is not a straightforward
environmental solution; Chinese environmental sci-
entists have argued that moving heavy industry to
the chemical park in Nanjing has in fact concen-
trated risk (Meng et al. 2014; Kang et al. 2017).
We decided to focus on Nanjing as a case study
because of its role as a leading traditional base of the
petrochemical industry in China, its high levels of
pollution and environmental risk related to the con-
centration of heavy industry, and the lack of wide-
spread protests over pollution in the city.5 The case
study is both illustrative and exemplary (Flyvbjerg
2001; Yin 2009), revealing dynamics within a par-
ticular type of petrochemical area, with common yet
distinct features. It is also a “nested” case study
because there are several petrochemical complexes
within the city, concentrated in two main petro-
chemical areas in Nanjing (Figure 1). The first area
is located in Nanjing Chemical Industry Park, which
was established in 2001 in northeast Nanjing, as a
major national-level chemical industry park in
Jiangsu Province.6 It is a typical industry cluster that
“consists of firms and related economic factors and
institutions that draw productive advantage from
their mutual proximity and connections” (Pillai
2006, 3). Nanjing Chemical Industry Park includes
more than 130 companies, including state-owned,
privately owned, and multinational enterprises. The
second area is located south of the Yangtze River
and includes a small number of large enterprises.
Both petrochemical areas host special oil piers for
ease of water transportation.
We conducted our research in two fieldwork trips
to both petrochemical areas in Nanjing in March
2016 and September and October 2016.7 The
research included twenty-five semistructured inter-
views and participant observation with employees in
petrochemical plants and related industries, retired
workers, local taxi drivers, shop owners, migrant
workers, residents, government officials, and village
leaders in these two petrochemical industrial areas.
We also interviewed local nongovernmental organ-
ization (NGO) representatives, researchers, and law-
yers, to gain a wider understanding of the complex
local environmental and political issues.
All research was conducted in accordance with
professional sociological ethical guidelines of
informed consent and confidentiality. We inter-
viewed men and women, younger and older people,
and migrants and traditional urban villagers, but we
did not collect precise demographic information for
reasons of anonymity and rapport, given the sensitiv-
ity of environmental topics in China. Access to par-
ticipants was very challenging, and all interviews
were arranged through gatekeepers and snowball
sampling. The names of interviewees given are
pseudonyms to protect the identities of research
participants. The names of the specific villages and
industrial enterprises we researched have also
been anonymized.
In China, most petrochemical plants cluster in
the periurban places where villages were originally
located in the past, prior to urban development.
When the petrochemical plants were originally con-
structed in the 1950s and 1960s, residential buildings
for employees were also built nearby. During our
research in Nanjing, this historical heritage was still
visibly marked by place names such as Oil-petro
Road, Petrochemical Road, and Petrochemical
Village. For decades, the petrochemical company
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employees, workers, and families were the main resi-
dents in these petrochemical fenceline communities,
alongside the original villagers. The demographics of
the petrochemical villages have gradually shifted
since the 1980s, however, related to urban expansion
and population migration since China’s economic
reform in the 1980s and the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises in the late 1990s.
In the areas near petrochemical plants in
Nanjing, the main population consisted of socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged groups, including retired
workers, villagers, and migrant workers.
Petrochemical employees had started to move out of
the petrochemical areas, seeking to escape the pollu-
tion, and also looking for better schools for their
children. The petrochemical employees either sold
or rented their houses to migrant workers, who were
attracted by cheaper rents and job opportunities.
Villagers also moved away for higher education or
work, and the people who stayed were mostly senior
citizens. At the time of our research, the majority of
residents in these communities were migrant workers.8
Although migrant workers were able to move to the
periurban villages, the dichotomy hukou (house regis-
tration) system officially maintained their identities as
countryside people.9 Most migrant workers rented their
houses, which meant that unlike urban workers and
village farmers with permanent residential status, they
were not eligible to receive compensation for damages
to housing or land.
The petrochemical industry, in China as well as
globally, is spatially integrated with related indus-
tries. In practice, it was very difficult to separate dif-
ferent industrial sources of pollution. Alongside
petrochemical enterprises, other industries in these
areas included transport, coal, fertilizers, logistics,
and specialty chemicals, among others. Thus,
although focusing on petrochemical industrial areas
as a starting point for our investigations, our research
also included perceptions of industrial pollution from
multiple sources, which added to the accumulated
injuries of environmental injustice.
Accumulated Injuries of
Environmental Injustice
We developed the concept of accumulated injuries
to capture how people’s injuries of health and well-
being overlapped and intersected, echoing the “triple
jeopardy” of social, environmental, and health
inequalities (Pearce et al. 2010) involving multiple
forms of disadvantage. Our idea of accumulated inju-
ries of environmental injustice emerged from ethno-
graphic findings and extends the sociological concept
of the “hidden injuries of class” (Sennett and Cobb
1972), which focused on dislocations of social mobil-
ity among U.S. blue-collar workers to consider wider,
cumulative effects of social and environmental
inequality within China across different social groups.
These “injuries” include the complex social, psycho-
logical, and material effects of environmental injustice
and “slow violence” (Nixon 2011) and overt as well
as hidden forms of wounding. Accumulated injuries
of environmental injustice in periurban Nanjing were
experienced unevenly, demonstrating social inequal-
ities across different populations, particularly between
permanent and migrant workers and residents. These
injuries were both hidden and in plain sight, figura-
tive as well as literal, and psychological as well as
material and visceral. This connects with Walkerdine
and Jimenez’s (2012) research on the psychosocial
and affective impacts of deindustrialization for com-
munities in Wales, which emphasizes the anxiety,
hurt, and pain of people living with chronic insecur-
ity and industrial blight (see also Mah 2012).
The concept of accumulation of injuries resonates
with the epidemiological terms of cumulative inci-
dence and cumulative risk, used for measuring disease
frequency and rates (Brown 1993). The basis for our
analysis is qualitative and ethnographic, rather than
quantitative. This follows a turn to qualitative
approaches in environmental health research, which
offer a way to produce community narratives that
give voice to individuals and characterize the com-
munity (Brown 2011). The notion of accumulation
also has an important temporal dimension, which is
particularly relevant for studies of toxic geographies.
As Murphy (2013, 107) argued, the effects of toxic
hazards often accumulate over generations, allowing
past pollution to “defer its violence to the present”
(see also Davies 2018).
Accumulated injuries of pollution reflect the lived
experiences in hazardscapes, a concept within the
sociological environmental health literature used to
describe the cumulative hazards within a geograph-
ical area, including not only quantifiable health
hazards but also perceptions of risk (Corson 1999;
Cutter 2002; Mustafa 2005).
Our research contributes to interdisciplinary
debates about lay understandings of environmental
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health and justice in “contaminated communities”
(Allen 2003; Edelstein 2004; Brown 2011), environ-
mental pollution in China (Tilt 2006; Bullard and
Wright 2009; Lora-Wainwright 2017), and lived
experiences of toxicity and exposure (Petryna 2002;
Allen 2003; Auyero and Swistun 2009; Davies 2018;
Jovanovic 2018). More specifically, it contributes to
debates about the politics of compensation in toxic
spaces and the wider question of whether it is ever
possible to put a value on human life (Petryna 2002;
van Rooij et al. 2012; Barry 2013; Gilbert and
Ponder 2014; Davies and Polese 2015). People living
and working in petrochemical areas in Nanjing, like
in many other parts of China, have limited access to
information about health risks related to pollution
and few opportunities to seek compensation for
damages, mitigation, or accidents.
We argue that accumulated injuries emerged in
three interrelated ways, relating to environmental
injustices of distribution, recognition, and participa-
tion. First, accumulated injuries were based on epi-
stemic injustices, where there was widespread local
knowledge about illnesses from environmental expo-
sures, yet these lacked official recognition. Second,
accumulated injuries were experienced in the uneven
and inadequate financial compensations offered by
polluting enterprises for environmental harms.
Third, accumulated injuries related to agency, a col-
lective sense of powerlessness and resignation about
the possibility of change, accentuated by environ-
mental injustices of toxic exposures.
Epistemic Injustices: “It Affects Our Life
Span, Apparently”
The majority of people in petrochemical areas of
Nanjing, both workers and residents, observed that
there were health effects due to pollution, despite
having different socioeconomic statuses and percep-
tions of risk. The acknowledgment yet relative toler-
ance of health risks in petrochemical areas of
Nanjing represents a form of epistemic injustice.
Fricker (2007) identified two main kinds of epi-
stemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermen-
eutical injustice: “Testimonial injustice occurs when
prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of
credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injust-
ice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair dis-
advantage when it comes to making sense of their
social experiences” (1). Hermeneutical injustice was
particularly pronounced for marginalized petrochem-
ical villagers in Nanjing, where the health risks of
pollution were normalized.
The most commonly reported illnesses both in
the communities and in the plants were cancer and
nasitis. Some local residents said that 70 percent of
children in their community near the petrochemical
cluster had nasitis. When asked why so many chil-
dren got sick, but not adults, a petrochemical worker
who had nasitis replied: “People pay more attention
to their children’s health, and always take the chil-
dren for checking up whenever there is a small prob-
lem. But for adults, sometimes people just ignore it
and do not go to hospital as often as sending their
children there” (interview, from field notes, March
2016). Other workers and residents said that cancer
in particular had increased in the past fifteen years.
People’s reasons for believing that there were
health effects ranged from informal sources of infor-
mation, to knowledge of people who had suffered ill-
nesses, to personal experience of illnesses, to
intuition. In other words, health impacts of petro-
chemical pollution were sensed, observed, consid-
ered, or experienced, but these were normalized,
alongside a lack of publicly available information
about toxic exposures. This echoes the findings of
Davies (2018), who highlighted the “slow observa-
tions” of communities who bear witness to pollution
in Louisiana’s Cancer Alley. As one petrochemical
company worker explained, “Of course the chemical
plant affects our health, however whether it is really
caused by the chemical plant, is difficult to say”
(interview, Wu, March 2016).
Our research findings differ from Tilt’s (2006)
study of the different risk perceptions of industrial
pollution among occupational groups in rural China,
where industrial workers perceived fewer health risks
than farmers and community and health service
workers. If anything, workers in our research
reported more health effects than villagers, who
were more likely to say, “I do not know, I am not
familiar with that,” a typical response to outsiders’
questions in rural China (field notes, September
2016; see also Lora-Wainwright 2017). The general
acceptance of health risks on the part of the indus-
trial workers in our study could be accounted for by
two factors. First, the petrochemical enterprises
implicitly acknowledged occupational health prob-
lems related to working in the plants, particularly
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the “frontline” toxic jobs, offering medical checkups,
rehabilitation retreats, and early retirement to the
worst affected. Second, the more privileged petro-
chemical employees were able to protect themselves,
compared with more precarious migrant workers, by
moving away from the immediate proximity of
industrial plants to less polluted areas and by work-
ing in less dangerous jobs.
Many local accounts emphasized the common-
sense, self-evident, and widely accepted local know-
ledge about toxic exposures in the community. For
example, petrochemical worker Li thought that there
was a connection between health and pollution on
an intuitive level: “Over these years, I feel there are
more people getting cancer. Not sure if it’s associ-
ated with the working environment. … Somehow I
feel there must be some connection” (interview,
March 2016). Similarly, petrochemical worker Yang
highlighted intuitive knowledge about the links
between health and pollution:
There is harm to health. The exhaust from the
chemical factories ultimately affects our body.
Otherwise, why would we retire at the age of fifty?
Especially if you are not feeling well, you can retire in
your forties. … For workers, we retire at fifty.
Everyone knows there’s danger and radiation, so it’s
best to retire early. (Interview, March 2016)
An elderly female villager described how her forty-
two-year-old daughter, who worked as a lab analyst
in the petrochemical refinery, was eligible for health
compensations due to the toxic exposures involved
in her job. Her daughter had a low white blood cell
count. Her work was particularly dangerous because
it involved taking oil samples and working closely
with toxic substances. Each year, the company pro-
vided her daughter and other lab employees with the
opportunity to rest for one week at a company
rehabilitation center (field notes, September 2016)
Another petrochemical employee confirmed that for
cases like the villager’s daughter, early retirement
would be an option:
We have health checking once per year; we have a
special department in charge of this. For people who
work at positions that are toxic or dangerous, if they
work there for eight years, they can retire earlier. For
instance, if one works in this company for thirty years,
but twenty-two years in the office, and eight years in a
toxic and dangerous position, then if the retirement
age is fifty-five, he can retire by fifty. (Interview,
October 2016)
Although several workers attributed early retirement
to occupational risk, early retirement policies might
have also related to labor management policies of
state-owned enterprises to shed surplus labor, rather
than social welfare entitlements. Since 1997, pen-
sions have no longer been directly provided by state-
owned enterprises (Smyth, Zhai, and Hu 2001).
Some petrochemical company workers felt that
they were at particularly high risk from toxic expo-
sures due to the agglomeration of polluting industries
where they worked, including fly ash, coal, and sul-
fur. For example, Liu, a petrochemical company
worker, said that working with coal dust “definitely
affects human health and respiratory tract.
Specifically, it affects our trachea. As to potential
effect, it’s a lot more. For example, it affects your
life span, apparently. It goes without saying” (inter-
view, March 2016).
Other workers showed knowledge of occupational
diseases in their workplaces but emphasized that
they were at a distance from the frontline of expos-
ure. Petrochemical worker Zhang reported that a
number of other workers at his plant were diagnosed
with cancer during medical checkups, but those who
were diagnosed were not from his line of work
(interview, September 2016). This theme of differen-
tiation between one line of work and another was
echoed in Wong’s narrative.
Wong: Since I came to this chemical enterprise, I have
always known that chemical enterprises do harm to
human health.
Researcher: What do you think of the enterprise now,
compared to other enterprises, so many years later?
Wong: I’m not working on the frontline; therefore, I’m
better off. I have no direct contact with those people
working on the frontline. (Interview, petrochemical
worker, September 2016)
Even the most ambivalent responses among workers
about the connections between pollution and health
did not go so far as to outright deny them. For
example, this was evident in the following exchange
with Tian, a petrochemical worker who was reluctant
to make any statements about health and pollution:
Researcher: Since you work the chemical industry
nearby, do you find this affecting your health in a
different way from other places?
Tian: I guess more or less as we have the chemical
industry in the neighborhood.
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Researcher: You mean there might be some impact
on health?
Tian: Yeah, possibly. (Interview, March 2016)
Despite the acknowledgment of occupational health
risks by many workers, they often felt that the bene-
fits of working in large state-owned petrochemical
plants outweighed the possible risks. State-owned
enterprises typically had better health and safety pro-
cedures than smaller enterprises in China, particu-
larly for regular workers (see M.-S. Chen and Chan
2010; He et al. 2014; Ho 2017). Although many
benefits had been eroded, skilled workers had rela-
tively high wages and job stability, and some hoped
that their children would work in big state-owned
petrochemical factories in the future. According to
Warner (2000), the danwei (work unit) in
Communist China prior to restructuring “provided
not only an economic and industrial structural form
but also a political and psychological one” (4). The
most privileged urban workers, known as zhuren
(masters), were employed in state-owned enterprises,
and they were provided with job security, good
working conditions, housing, and welfare facilities.
With restructuring of state-owned enterprises,
however, many of these benefits were being eroded.
Some workers at petrochemical enterprises in
Nanjing expressed frustration at the loss of benefits
over the years, combined with problems of pollution
and occupational illnesses. “Our enterprise used to
be a big commune,” said one petrochemical worker
(interview, Wong, September 2016). “The hospital
is now gone, and so is the Design Institute.”
Another worker echoed this complaint:
In terms of our income, there has been less welfare
since Xi took office. The welfare system has been
reformed. It is stipulated that everyone be given 500
yuan on occasions of public holidays. We would even
get mooncake for the Mid-Autumn Festival, and
glutinous rice dumplings for the Dragon Boat Festival
before. There weren’t such things last year. (Interview,
Zhang, September 2016)
According to a village leader in a street near one
petrochemical area, few villagers worked in the
petrochemical plant or related sectors because the
petrochemical company recruited university gradu-
ates with technical knowledge (interview, Zhao,
March 2016). In the past, villagers had benefited
from the petrochemical plants through working there
or making economic income by providing related
services such as transportation or construction. The
main complaint of the villagers was the dust from
heavy factory truck traffic and poor road conditions:
The road condition in our village is very bad; the
factory trucks all pass through here. In 2003, we
repaired it by ourselves, but after only one year, it was
broken again. There is a lot of dust at night; the trucks
go through our village with thundering noise. Our
village wants to do something, but money is a big
problem; we can only make small repairs. (Interview,
Zhao, village leader, September 2016)
The reports of noise and dust pollution, which have
been associated with sleep disruption, anxiety, and
mental health disorders, echoed findings from other
low-income, polluted fenceline communities around
the world; for example, in the Port of Long Beach,
California (Gottlieb and Ng 2017).
Although health effects from pollution were
widely accepted by workers and residents alike, with
a wide range of sources for local knowledge, there
were no official reports or epidemiological studies to
which they could turn. Implicitly, their claims were
accepted by state-owned enterprises, through offering
financial compensation for polluted land, piping in
clean water to communities when water supplies
were contaminated, and offering health retreats and
early retirement for workers. When we asked petro-
chemical workers whether the detection of cancer
within regular medical checkups was treated by the
petrochemical enterprises as an occupational disease,
however, the answer was decidedly “no.”
Local people had lay knowledge about the health
risks of pollution, but this was uneven and frag-
mented. Some environmental NGOs have worked to
improve problems of industrial pollution in Nanjing,
but their activities have been carefully monitored
and restricted by the government (field notes,
September 2016). This shows the limits of the role
of alliances between professional scientists and civil
society (Allen 2003; Ottinger and Cohen 2011) in
advocating for change, in a case where the risks
from toxic exposures are plainly evident, particularly
for marginalized migrant workers, yet civil society
action is limited.
Valuing Life: Unequal and Inadequate
Compensations
Workers and residents in our study reported that
farmers and other residents in their communities had
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sought financial compensation for damages to land,
but these were possible only in cases of acute con-
tamination (evident in dead fish, accidents, or land
on the immediate fenceline). Instead of joining peti-
tions for compensation, workers and residents
attempted to mitigate their circumstances by closing
their windows on days with high pollution, occasion-
ally reporting pollution by phoning the environmen-
tal protection hotline, and taking holidays to places
with cleaner air. These practices resonate with find-
ings in many other communities exposed to pollu-
tion (see Auyero and Swistun 2009; Cousins 2016;
Lora-Wainwright 2017; Allen 2018).
In 2005, during the construction of the BASF-
YPC joint venture petrochemical site in Nanjing
Chemical Park, there were a number of protests and
demonstrations by local residents. According to
Grabicki (2015), author of the commemorative book
about the history of BASF in China, the protests
happened because 200 people were still living on the
fenceline of the plant first due to a “planning error
by the regional authorities” and second because of
an ammonia spill following a malfunction (194–95).
Grabicki (2015) argued that BASF understood the
importance of gaining “trust and support from the
local population” (195–96), and he suggested that
some of the residents’ claims for compensation were
dubious; for example, through purchasing new hous-
ing on the fenceline of the plant, inflating costs of
compensation for a turtle farm, and exploiting the
leverage of petitioning a multinational Western
company. These corporate fenceline dynamics have
parallels with Barry’s (2013) research findings about
disputes over compensation from British Petroleum
(BP) for beehives and trees during the construction
of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline.
At the time of our research in 2016, workers
and residents recalled protests over compensation,
but these were primarily described as periodic or
settled, rather than ongoing. Farmers had received
compensation for contaminated land and dead or
distressed animals. For example, one petrochemical
worker said:
People came to the company to protest [“make noise”],
rather than to the local government. They came to ask
about their houses, demolition, and relocation, or else
to protest when the fish in their privately owned fish
ponds died. (Interview, Sun, March 2016)
Another petrochemical worker reported a recent
incident, where poisonous gas had leaked out of a
pipeline and caused harm to farmers. The farmers
were paid compensation by the factory, and this had
ended the dispute: “The farmers could be dismissed
just by paying them” (interview, Wong, September
2016). This relates to van Rooij et al.’s (2012) argu-
ment that seeking compensation represents a “trap”
within community-based pollution regulation in
China. Furthermore, the uneven and inadequate
compensations demonstrate how Chinese citizens
have been neglected not only by petrochemical
enterprises but also by the state. This resonates with
research by Davies and Polese (2015) on the de
facto state abandonment of people living in
Ukraine’s nuclear exclusion zone.
None of the people whom we interviewed said
that they had personally protested or complained
about polluted land in order to seek compensation.
Rather, protests were reported as the actions of
others, mostly people living on the immediate fence-
line of industry, and related to acute contamination.
Hu, a petrochemical company worker, described the
compensation process as nearly complete:
Hu: The government has almost finished dealing with
most of this. Because there was a huge demolition
recently. All of the farms have been taken over. First
of all, they put the torch there. Hens won’t lay eggs
consequently.
Researcher: Hens won’t lay eggs?
Hu: That’s right. The sky is always like that, being so
bright with the torch nearby. Imagine all the hens
looking at the torch. (Interview, Hu, petrochemical
worker, March 2016)
For most petrochemical workers and village resi-
dents, the main environmental issue that they per-
ceived was air pollution, either as bad smells or as
dust. The severity depended on the wind direction
and the closest industries, which included a number
of industries related to petrochemicals. Some of the
workers thought that the air quality and health
impacts were worse within the companies than in
the communities because they were surrounded by
power plants, oil refineries, and other polluting
industries (field notes, March 2016).
One of the main possibilities for local residents to
take action about pollution was to call the hotline
of the government’s Environmental Protection
Bureau. This did not offer the possibility of financial
compensation for complainants, but it did have the
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possibility of imposing fines on companies. Although
some people said that they regularly complained to
the Environmental Protection Bureau, most people
thought that this was ineffective.
Compensations were also described, in some cases,
as voluntary. One petrochemical enterprise that had
contaminated its water supply installed a water treat-
ment facility to provide each community with clean
water. According to Hu:
Most people drink the pure water. … This shows the
idea of humanism is being gradually realized in the
concept behind what the government is doing. It’s not
like we can just discharge water and leave it to the
lower course of the river for purification. If there’s any
risk, we all suffer. (Interview, petrochemical worker,
March 2016)
This account shows a sense of trust in the enterprise
in terms of social responsibility, despite the problem
of contamination. It also reveals a cautious note of
optimism for the future, of a gradual realization of
the government’s plan. Hu explained further that he
frequently called the government hotline to com-
plain about night smells, which affected him even in
a community 1.5 km away from the industry. He was
convinced that the environmental monitoring hot-
line was improving, with more fines given to pollut-
ing enterprises, which had not been the case in the
past. Ultimately, Hu believed in an economic devel-
opment trade-off for living and working with petro-
chemical pollution: “The development of mankind is
supported by the existence of chemical industry, like
nuclear power plants. Its existence means some
degree of danger” (interview, March 2016). This cal-
culated balance between health and economic devel-
opment corresponds to findings about workers in
other industrial polluted communities (see Mah
2012; Neumann 2016; Jovanovic 2018). It also sug-
gests a “hidden injury of class” (Sennett and Cobb
1972) in the conflict of different personal and soci-
etal values.
Petrochemical enterprises have offered compen-
sation to those people who are most immediately
affected by pollution, either through accidents or
through residence at the fenceline. In most cases,
compensation is for traditional villagers (i.e., not
migrants) who have witnessed direct losses of land
and livelihoods from pollution. Workers who live
in petrochemical areas, like villagers, have raised
complaints about smells through calling the
Environmental Protection Bureau and received
alternative water supplies due to contaminated fac-
tory water. Companies have offered basic compen-
sations to settle disputes and be able to carry on
with their activities, but these forms of compensa-
tion have been very limited in terms of eligible
recipients. Compensation for health problems asso-
ciated with pollution was also extremely limited
and only available indirectly, through offering heath
checkups, health retreats, and early retirement to
workers in high-risk jobs. This case falls short of offer-
ing even the “compensation trap” described by van
Rooij et al. (2012), due to low levels of perceived pol-
itical agency.
Collective Frustration: “But What Can We Do?”
Our research revealed an overarching narrative of
collective frustration at political powerlessness,
exemplified in the phrase, “But what can we do?”
(field notes, September 2016). Although there were
different levels of trust in industrial enterprises
among the different populations living and working
with petrochemical pollution in Nanjing, there was
a common resigned attitude toward the status quo in
relation to entrenched pollution and health prob-
lems. Very often, people would say, “We cannot do
anything about it,” or “What can we do?” This find-
ing relates to Lora-Wainwright’s (2017) idea of
“resigned activism” within rural China but with a
deeper bitterness. Like people living in Cancer Alley
in Louisiana, people in petrochemical villages in
Nanjing expressed their “toxic frustration” (Singer
2011; see also Allen 2003; Huber 2017; Davies
2018). When we asked one migrant worker why peo-
ple do not file complaints about the pollution, he
said, a bit angrily, “To report [the pollution situ-
ation]? For what? They are all the Communist
Party’s factories, so why do we complain to the
Communist Party?” (field notes, March 2016).
Residents who were affected the most by the
petrochemical industry in Nanjing were mostly
socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, including
retired workers, villagers, and migrant workers. For
different reasons, they generally held a passive atti-
tude toward the industry as a polluter. Compared to
the people who have vocally opposed the planned
siting of petrochemical projects in their communities
in anti-PX protests, petrochemical fenceline com-
munities in Nanjing have voiced little resistance. In
addition, the ubiquitous environmental problems in
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China, such as the rampant smog, have played the
role of diminishing and naturalizing the severe situ-
ation of fenceline communities. For example, one
migrant worker scoffed: “Environment? Everywhere
is the same. Do you think the air is better in
Xinjiekou [a central commercial area in Nanjing]?
Clean places, only in the mountains” (field notes,
September 2016). Because migrant workers continue
to face few job opportunities in their hometowns,
the benefit of employment clearly prevails over their
worries about the environment or health, and this
leads to the sacrifice of living amidst toxic pollution.
In one petrochemical village, we spoke with an
elderly woman who was resting on a long brick laid
bench along a path. She told us that most people
who live in this place were nonlocals, including her
family. When we discussed the pollution in the vil-
lage and whether she had concerns about it, she
replied: “Oh, so what? What could we do?” (field
notes, September 2016). She then explained that
because her family were not locals and nobody
would really listen, they could not do anything. She
was not eligible for free breast cancer and cervical
cancer screening that was offered to female residents
in the community with Nanjing household registra-
tions (hukou). Then she reflected on what they
could do, given their constraints as a migrant family:
When there were holidays, they would go back to
their hometown with their grandchildren, and the
air there was good (field notes, September 2016).
Several other residents and workers also discussed
their practices of taking holidays for clean air, simi-
lar to the evacuation retreats organized for children
in communities affected by the Chernobyl and
Fukushima disasters (see Cousins 2016).
The phrase “used to it” was repeated frequently in
the research. Chen, a petrochemical village leader
said, laughing with irony: “Is there a strong smell
here? You can smell it, but we cannot at all. We are
used to it and completely unaware of it. Many things
are not visible to our naked eyes.” Li, a petrochemical
worker, said, “I am used to this place. It doesn’t mat-
ter much that it’s this bad” (interview, March 2016).
Yang, another petrochemical worker, said, “We are
all used to this situation in the environment.
Sometimes they call up to report [to the
Environmental Protection Bureau]. I don’t know the
phone number, so I don’t know where to call. We
simply shut the doors and windows. Nothing more
than that” (interview, March 2016). These narratives
echo Stawkowski’s (2016) research findings, where
the self-titled “radioactive mutants” in nuclear land-
scapes of Kazakhstan claimed that they were used
to radiation.
Several of our research participants reported that
petrochemical enterprises would secretly discharge
chemical waste during the evenings when people
had gone home, when nobody was on patrol, or
when it rained. This was described as common
practice, which people responded to by closing their
windows. For example, Lin, a petrochemical
worker, explained:
This enterprise sometimes would secretly discharge
the wastes in the evenings. Now such a practice has
been reduced, but not eliminated. Secretly discharging
still takes place in the evening sometimes. We keep
our windows closed in the evenings. (Interview,
March 2016)
The common attitudes of resignation were typical of
all of the different social groups, but the sense of
frustration was deeper for villagers and migrants. As
petrochemical village leader Chen explained,
“Pollution? Dust, and as you say, smell, but we can’t
see it. But what can we do? It has nothing to do
with us, we even cannot enter the chemical plant”
(interview, March 2016). Without access to what
was happening inside the barred gates of petrochem-
ical complexes, apart from sensing smells, seeing
smoke, and experiencing illnesses, villagers had no
official information about the impact of petrochem-
ical plants on the environment or people’s health.
This toxic frustration links to the problems of epi-
stemic justice and uneven and inadequate compensa-
tions, coalescing together as accumulated injuries of
environmental injustice.
Conclusion
Petrochemical villages in Nanjing are marked by
environmental injustice, not only in terms of the
unequal distribution of environmental hazards in dis-
advantaged communities but also in the lack of recog-
nition or political participation. Nanjing has a history
of dependency on the state-owned petrochemical
industry, which remains deeply embedded materially
and culturally within the urban and industrial land-
scape. After decades of economic restructuring, fre-
quent toxic explosions, and mounting pollution, the
industrial social contract has started to fray.
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The possibilities for political action to address
toxic exposures in China are extremely limited, and
ultimately people seek pragmatic solutions. Where
possible, some people in the petrochemical villages of
Nanjing have sought basic financial compensations
from industry for acute loss of livelihoods and health,
but these compensations have been inadequate and
uneven, paralleling the politics of compensation and
social welfare in toxic geographies around the world
(Petryna 2002; van Rooij et al. 2012; Barry 2013;
Gilbert and Ponder 2014; Davies and Polese 2015).
Overall, residents and workers highlighted their lack
of political power to campaign for justice, cleanup, or
meaningful compensation, a stark reflection of the
unequal politics of knowledge and science (Fricker
2007; Boudia and Jas 2014; Allen 2018). In the
wider Chinese context, these injustices of political
voice and power relate to collective attitudes of resig-
nation and pragmatism among ordinary people cop-
ing with the immense problems of pollution (Lora-
Wainwright 2017). The most common response
among local people living next to petrochemical fac-
tories was a sense of frustration, reflecting the epi-
stemic injustice (Fricker 2007) of knowing the
negative health and environmental effects of petro-
chemical pollution, yet not having the power to do
anything about it. This highlights the importance of
examining cases of environmental injustice outside of
Western democratic contexts.
Accumulated injuries of environmental injustice
are evident in everyday communities throughout
China, a country with unprecedented scales of indus-
trial and urban development, considerable con-
straints on civil society, powerful state-owned
enterprises, and multiple sources of pollution and
risk. The concept of accumulated injuries demon-
strates the cumulative, nested social, environmental,
and health effects of living and working with toxic
pollution and how these relate to intense inequal-
ities. By focusing explicitly on environmental injust-
ice, rather than the more abstract ideal of justice, we
have underscored the relevance of attending to areas
marked by the slow violence of environmental dev-
astation. Accumulated injuries of environmental
injustice in petrochemical areas in Nanjing were
severe and unjust, despite the absence of overt disas-
ter or protest. The concepts of accumulation, injury,
and injustice offer scope for making nuanced global
comparisons about the complex social, temporal, and
spatial effects of toxicity and environmental justice.
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Notes
1. The plant was relocated to Zhangzhou in Fujian
Province, where there have since been major
explosions in 2013 and 2015.
2. This trio of national companies was formed in 1949
under the Fuel and Industry Department of China,
and they were later transformed into state-owned
enterprises in the 1980s. The industry was radically
transformed following the “grab the big, release the
small” policy adopted by the Communist Party of
China in September 1997, which aimed to promote
large state-owned enterprises, including joint
venture companies (Nolan 2001; Smyth, Zhai, and
Hu 2001; Lin 2008).
3. The traditional legacy of the petrochemical industry
in Nanjing is exemplified by the failed “Donglian
experiment” of the late 1990s. In January 1997, the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China
“formally designated the petrochemical industry as
the model industry for others to study in
experimenting with the national holding company
system” (Nolan 2001, 464). According to Lin (2008),
“The most notable case of daring but ill-conceived
experimentation” (74) was the Donglian experiment in
Nanjing. This was a merger of four competing
southern regional refining giants on the southeast coast
of the Yangtze River into a single company, Donglian,
as the largest enterprise group in China. Similar to
many subordinate enterprises of Sinopec, the four
merged companies had strong and distinct corporate
identities (Nolan 2001; Lin 2008). The Donglian
experiment ultimately failed, however, because it was
not able to compete on a global level (see Nolan
2001; Smyth, Zhai, and Hu 2001; Lin 2008).
4. In 2014, the city government of Nanjing made a
decision to close or relocate all remaining heavy
14 Mah and Wang
industries to the chemical park within ten years,
although this has stalled in the face of vested
interests of state-owned enterprises (Shi 2015).
Local governments in China have also faced
increased pressure since 2013 to meet environmental
responsibility targets for emissions reductions and
energy savings set by the central government
(Goran 2017). Environmental responsibility targets
have officially been in place since 1996, but they
have been extended and enforced since 2013.
5. At the time of writing, the most significant public
environment protest to have happened in Nanjing
was a campaign in 2011 to save urban trees (see
Steinhardt and Wu 2015).
6. There are in total twelve national-level industry
parks, including four chemical parks in Jiangsu
Province: Nanjing Chemical Industry Park, Nanjing
Economic Development Zone Fine Chemical
Industry Park, Changzhou Binjiang Chemical
Industry Park, and Nantong Chemical Industry Park
(Jiangsu Investment Net 2015).
7. We developed our case study research methodology
as part of a comparative project and both authors
undertook a preliminary field trip to China in
November 2015. The second author conducted the
primary field research in Nanjing, with support from
a research assistant, and both authors analyzed the
interview transcripts and field notes. The
semistructured interviews were conducted in
Chinese, recorded, and later transcribed and
translated into English. The informal interviews
were recorded in field notes as part of the
participant observation, with verbal consent from
interviewees. Anonymized interview transcripts and
field notes are on file with the research project.
8. In one village about a kilometer away from the
petrochemical area, there were about 3,000
permanent villager residents and an estimated
migrant population of about 8,000 (interview,
village official, October 2016). This demographic
profile parallels dynamics in other petrochemical
villages in China; for example, in Guangzhou,
another case study focus of this research project.
9. The Hukou system in China requires all households to
register, and it divides people in China into urban and
rural residents. People registered as rural residents often
face discrimination when they live in cities. They
normally take low-paid jobs with no pension or
welfare, and their children cannot go to local schools
in cities due to their hukou registration.
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